How Constellation Brands Pays

Operational and professional ladder — B1 through B7

Leadership ladder — Senior Director through Senior Vice President

Disclosed executive layer

Track divergence

Hierarchy qualifications and legacy structures

• Public job postings show analyst, specialist, manager, senior manager, director and vice president titles, but no official B1 to B9 architecture was found in any filing, careers page or posting. The labels here exist to make Mexican production work, United States corporate work and Australasian commercial work comparable on one page.
• A software-engineering ladder does not fit this company. Technology, enterprise-data and analytics roles exist, but breweries, wineries, agriculture, glass, supply chain, sales and marketing are the core populations, so the ladder is mapped as a functional and operational track.
• No legacy numerical band inherited from a predecessor company, no post-merger grade-harmonization programme and no disclosed equivalence to a peer's internal grades was found. Portfolio acquisitions and divestitures create local title history, which is not the same as a documented band system.
• The Mexican production population is covered by collective bargaining across roughly 20 percent of the global workforce. Where an agreement governs pay, the band model describes the market rather than the contractual scale, and the contractual scale is not public.
• The band table stops at the Senior Vice President tier. Named executives and non-employee directors are real disclosures but they are single worldwide figures rather than a local pay range in any city, so they are carried in the executive section instead of the geographic model.

Peer-level mapping

Office and market catalogue — calibration factors versus Rochester

The company discloses no city-level headcount and names no largest site. Nava and Ciudad Obregón are likely among the largest concentrations because Mexico holds most of the workforce and both are major breweries, but that is an inference from the property and geography disclosures rather than a census. Mumbai, Bengaluru, Toronto, London, Singapore and Dubai appear in the source bundle only as disabled comparison placeholders with no verified employing entity, and are omitted here.

Rochester anchor medians — the basis of every modeled cell

• The Rochester column is the anchor. B1 through B7 medians come from employer-linked and employee-reported United States observations: manager total compensation of about $107,000 to $162,000, director total of $205,000 to $303,000, and indexed posting ranges from Category Analyst at $85,400 to $128,100 up to National Accounts Manager at $105,100 to $164,400.
• Ciudad Obregón is the only Mexican site with a usable employer-specific sample: General Helper at MX$86,000 to MX$144,000, Manufacturing Specialist at MX$283,000 to MX$380,000, Team Leader at MX$402,000 to MX$420,000, Quality Specialist at MX$406,000 to MX$439,000 and Human Resources Manager at MX$749,000 to MX$805,000. Nava and Veracruz carry the same factors because no separate sample exists for either.
• Mexico City sits about 10 percent above the brewery towns for equivalent commercial work, on Analyst observations of MX$240,000 to MX$432,000, Executive Assistant at MX$420,000 to MX$618,000, Gerente at MX$850,000 to MX$1.0 million and sparse Director observations from MX$1 million to MX$3 million.
• Mexican total compensation runs at roughly 15 percent of the Rochester anchor at the hourly band and about 50 percent at director, so the multiple narrows from around six and a half times at entry to about two times at director. That compression is why Mexico carries level-dependent factors rather than one multiplier.
• New Zealand is close to flat at roughly 61 to 65 percent of the anchor across B2 to B6, but the hourly band is the exception: a Marlborough cellar or vineyard rate converts to about 87 percent of the United States hourly anchor, because United States hourly pay in this industry is low rather than because New Zealand pay is high.
• Australia is evidenced only from B3 to B6, on a Sydney Key Account Manager indication of A$90,000 to A$120,000 and related commercial roles. No defensible Australian production or executive range was found, so those cells are model extrapolations.

Executive incentive targets — percent of salary

Named-executive outcomes

• The plan data do not support a clean utilisation percentage. The disclosure mixes restricted stock units, maximum performance share units, legacy options and a newly approved reserve, and a naive ratio across those categories would be misleading, so the raw pool and outstanding figures are shown instead.
• The relevant counts at 28 February 2026 were 359,278 maximum unvested performance share units and 411,861 restricted stock units, alongside 2,774,353 securities outstanding under the equity-compensation plan table.
• Because the 6,000,000 share reserve took effect on 22 July 2026 and grants continued afterwards, the precise ungranted balance at the report date is not publicly disclosed.
• The employee stock purchase plan is the closest thing to a company-wide capacity number, and it is nearly exhausted: 977,943 shares of a 9,000,000 authorization remained at the FY2026 close.

Equity plan capacity and grant activity

Vesting — common reported employee schedule

FY2026 executive restricted stock units vest one third on each of the first three 1 May anniversaries, a three-year schedule rather than the four-year cadence common in technology. Performance share units settle on certification at the end of their performance period and can pay far from target, as the latest completed cycle did at approximately 33 percent. The annual non-employee-director award vests in a single instalment about a year after grant, on 10 July 2027 for the July 2026 grant.

Eligibility by hierarchy level

• There is no published minimum grade for a long-term award and no standard grant table at any level. The plan covers key employees, non-employee directors and consultants selected by the Human Resources Committee, which is a selection rule rather than an eligibility threshold.
• No routine grant is evidenced at B1 through B4. Eligible employees in those bands may participate in the employee stock purchase plan, which is the only stock mechanism an ordinary employee can rely on.
• Modeled scenario values published in the source bundle run from nothing to $25,000 at B5, $15,000 to $75,000 at B6, $50,000 to $250,000 at B7 and $150,000 to $2.0 million across the vice-president tier. None of these is a company disclosure and all should be treated as low confidence.
• Disclosed FY2026 target long-term incentive values run from $1.525 million for the Wine & Spirits president to $10.5 million for the chief executive, with the incoming chief executive's ongoing target set at $11.0 million.

Indicative annual grant value by band — Rochester

Annualized planning value (±25%), not the face value of every new-hire grant. Share equivalents use the $135.07 reference price at 26 August 2026 and ignore plan valuation rules and PSU performance. Highlighted rows are disclosed grant-date stock awards.

Named executive target equity

Fink's ongoing target package is approximately $14.64 million: $1.4 million of salary, a 160 percent cash incentive target worth $2.24 million and an $11.0 million annual long-term incentive target. Separately he received a replacement award of 85,385 restricted stock units and 415,295 non-qualified stock options vesting pro rata over three years, compensating for value forfeited at his prior employer; it is not part of the recurring target. At the $135.07 reference price the restricted stock unit portion alone is worth roughly $11.53 million, but the option portion cannot be valued by multiplying share count by market price because option value depends on exercise price, term and volatility. Other compensation for the named executives includes retirement contributions and disclosed perquisites such as aircraft use, automobile arrangements, product allowances, executive physicals, internet reimbursement and charitable matching, with no tax gross-up disclosed.

Board compensation framework

Reported FY2026 director totals ranged from approximately $298,086 to $495,883 depending on chair roles, partial-year timing and other compensation. The Sands family holds board seats and a dual-class voting structure, but director pay itself follows the standard schedule and executive pay remains subject to the Human Resources Committee and an advisory shareholder vote, which passed on 22 July 2026 by 137,687,386 votes to 7,170,493.

Not publicly disclosed

Modeled promotion planning timeline

The clearest progression signal in the public record is not a policy but an outcome: median employee compensation moved from $34,821 in FY2023 to $49,050 in FY2025 and $48,558 in FY2026, while headcount fell from about 10,700 to about 9,400. Those movements track workforce composition and a restructuring programme rather than an annual increase, so they cannot be read as a raise or a cut. On the executive side the annual review cycle is visible through the proxy, where the incentive factor fell from 155 percent in FY2023 to 54 percent in FY2026.

Dataset summary

City-level H-1B wage history

All-years aggregates. P25/P75 are rounded reconstruction values marked modeled; medians and record counts are the stronger fields.

Selected title / worksite records

Evidence classification

Explicit “Not publicly disclosed” index

Known gaps and diligence before relying on a cell

1. 1Named-executive and non-employee-director pay is deliberately absent from the band table. Those are single worldwide filing figures that are identical in every city, so including them would force every location factor towards 1.0 at the top of the ladder and produce absurd cells such as a Mexican brewery officer priced on a United States chief executive base. The band table therefore stops at the Senior Vice President tier and the executive tier is carried in full in the executive section instead.
2. 2The source bundle's total-compensation columns describe modeled recurring cash plus typical variable pay. Every total on this page was rebuilt from base plus target incentive plus modeled equity so that the components reconcile, and no employer benefit load, social-security contribution, aguinaldo, superannuation or KiwiSaver amount is included. Those are employer cost, not pay.
3. 3The bundle's B8 band spans $220,000 to $500,000 of base and $350,000 to $2.50 million of total, which is too wide to be one row. It is split here into Senior Director at the low end, Vice President at the midpoint and Senior Vice President at the high end, following the bundle's own explanation that the width reflects the gap between a functional vice president and an enterprise officer. The split is an interpretation, not a disclosure.
4. 4Mexican pay above the director band is not disclosed at all, and neither is New Zealand above senior manager, Australia outside the professional and management bands or Italy above senior manager. The factors for those cells are linear extrapolations of the fitted trend and are the least reliable numbers on the page.
5. 5New Zealand is modelled with a single flat factor even though the hourly band sits at roughly 87 percent of the United States anchor against about 61 percent for the professional bands. Fitting a slope through that one point would have distorted the bands where the evidence is strongest, so the step is described in the nuances instead.
6. 6United States city factors for Chicago, San Francisco, Napa and Sonoma, Lodi and Flowery Branch are labour-market cost adjustments applied to a national band model. The company publishes no city pay data and only San Francisco carries an independent signal through California pay-transparency ranges.
7. 7FY2024 figures are missing in several places. The bundle could not reliably extract the FY2024 enterprise incentive payout, the FY2024 chief executive total or the FY2024 median employee, and those are left blank rather than interpolated.
8. 8Two incentive targets are not separately disclosed in the extracted proxy content. The targets shown for James Bourdeau and Samuel Glaetzer are derived by dividing the disclosed payout by the disclosed attainment percentage, and are labelled as implied wherever they appear.
9. 9The equity plan disclosure mixes restricted stock units, maximum performance share units, legacy options and a newly approved reserve, so no comparable utilisation percentage can be calculated. Raw pool and outstanding figures are shown instead of a ratio that would look precise and mean nothing.
10. 10Six locations in the source bundle, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Toronto, London, Singapore and Dubai, were selector placeholders with no verified employing entity. They are dropped here rather than shown as empty or filled with country-market figures.
11. 11No company-wide FY2026 or FY2027 salary increase percentage, pay freeze, salary cut, campus offer revision or attrition rate was located in any source, and site-level totals for restructuring-related job losses were not consistently disclosed.

FX rates used — 1 USD equals, snapshot 2026-08-26

Single-date conversion layer for comparability; it ignores payroll-date FX, tax, purchasing power, benefits valuation and hedging. Compensation intelligence, not legal, tax, investment, immigration or employment advice.

Source register — 22 sources

The FY2026 decline coincided with portfolio changes and the organization review announced in April 2025, and it is large enough to move every workforce-derived statistic on this page. Because the disclosed count includes approximately 1,100 employees of the equally owned Owens-Illinois glass joint venture, the wholly owned workforce is smaller than 9,400. No country or city counts are published, so the 65 percent Mexico, 29 percent United States and 6 percent other split is the only geographic signal available.